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Introduction
Protection of the Environment and Jus Post Bellum:  
Some Preliminary Reflections
Carsten Stahn*, Jens Iverson**, and Jennifer S. Easterday***
A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the 
biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.1
I.1 State- of- the- Art
Protection of the environment and natural resources is a key element in the transi-
tion from armed conflict to peace. Most academic studies have focused on classical 
peacetime or conflict situations.2 The United Nations Environmental Programme 
(‘UNEP’) qualified the environment as a ‘silent casualty’ of armed conflict.3 
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1 Aldo Leopold, ‘The Land Ethic’ in A Sand County Almanac (New  York:  Oxford University Press, 
1949), 262.
2 See, for example, Karen Hulme, War- Torn Environment: Interpreting the Legal Threshold (Leiden: Brill, 
2004); Carl Bruch and Jay Austin, The Environmental Consequences of War: Legal, Scientific and Economic 
Perspectives (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2000); Rosemary Rayfuse (ed.), War and the 
Environment – New Approaches to Protecting the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflict (Leiden: Brill, 
2014); Michael Bothe, Carl Bruch, Jordan Diamond, and David Jensen, ‘International Law Protecting the 
Environment During Armed Conflict: Gaps and Opportunities’ (2010) 92 International Review of the Red 
Cross 576; Cordula Droege and Marie- Louise Togas, ‘The Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed 
Conflict: Existing Rules and the Need for Further Legal Protection’ (2013) 82 Nordic Journal of International 
Law 21; Erik Koppe, ‘The Principle of Ambiguity and the Prohibition Against Excessive Collateral Damage 
to the Environment During Armed Conflict’ (2013) 82 Nordic Journal of International Law 53– 82; Daniella 
Dam, ‘From Engines for Conflict into Engines for Sustainable Development: The Potential of International 
Law to Address Predatory Exploitation of Natural Resources in Situations of Internal Armed Conflict’ 
(2013) 82 Nordic Journal of International Law 155.
3 UNEP, Press Release, ‘Environment is the “silent casualty” of armed conflict’, 6 November 2016, at 
<http:// reliefweb.int/ sites/ reliefweb.int/ files/ resources/ Environment%20is%20the%20%27silent%20
casualty%27of%20armed%20conflict_ EN.pdf> accessed 15 August 2017.
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Exploring the protection of the environment in the aftermath of armed conflict4 
and its relationship to sustainable peace is a relatively novel perspective.5
The environmental devastation caused by armed conflict has prompted an expan-
sion in the international legal framework governing environmental protection. For 
instance, the damage caused by the Vietnam War encouraged the adoption of the 
Environmental Modification Convention (‘ENMOD’) and Additional Protocol I  to 
the Geneva Conventions which strengthened the protection of the environment from 
widespread destruction during conflict.6 ENMOD restricted the modification of nature 
as a weapon of war.7 Additional Protocol I protected the environment itself (Art. 35(3)), 
as well as the human population (Art. 54), and banned attacks against the natural envi-
ronment by way of reprisals (Art. 55(2)). The 1991 Iraq War led to unprecedented oil 
spills in the Persian Gulf. It prompted the adoption of Security Council Resolution 687 
(1991),8 as well as the establishment of the United Nations Compensation Commission 
which dealt inter alia with environmental damage. Since the 1990s, the UNEP, other 
UN agencies, and numerous NGOs have taken a control role in assessing and docu-
menting environmental damage caused by conflict.9 The International Committee of 
the Red Cross (‘ICRC’) has developed guidelines for the protection of the environment 
during armed conflict10 which were endorsed by the General Assembly.11 Principle 
24 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development specifies expressly that 
states shall provide ‘protection for the environment in armed conflict’ since ‘[w] arfare 
is inherently destructive of sustainable development’.12 Several disarmament instru-
ments contain duties to remove remnants of war or to destroy weapons after conflict in 
conditions that do not result in significant damage to the environment.13 Efforts have 
4 In Tadić, the ICTY defined armed conflict as ‘a situation in which there is resort to armed force between 
States or protracted resort to armed force between governmental authorities and organized armed groups’. 
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, No. 
IT- 94- I- AR72, 2 October 1995, para 70.
5 See Toxic Remnants of War Project, Environmental Mechanics: Re- Imaging Post- Conflict Environmental 
Assistance (Toxic Remnants of War Project, 2015), at <http:// www.toxicremnantsofwar.info/ wp- content/ 
uploads/ 2015/ 11/ TRWP_ Environmental_ Mechanics.pdf> accessed 15 August 2017.
6 Under Art. 1 of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Technique (‘ENMOD’), parties undertake ‘not to engage in military or any 
other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long- lasting or severe effects 
as a means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State party’. See Convention on the Prohibition of 
Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, 18 May 1977, 16 I.L.M. 90. 
On its limited scope of application, see Michael Schmitt, ‘Humanitarian Law and the Environment’ (2000) 
28 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 265.
7 See also Rule 45 of the ICRC Customary Law Study.
8 Resolution 687 specified that Iraq is ‘liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, includ-
ing environmental damage . . . as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait’.
9 UNEP has traced the effects of conflicts on the environment in more than twenty reports. See UNEP, 
Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International Law (2009), 
at <http:// www.un.org/ zh/ events/ environmentconflictday/ pdfs/ int_ law.pdf> accessed 15 August 2017.
10 ICRC, Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of the Environment in 
Times of Armed Conflict, at <https:// www.icrc.org/ eng/ resources/ documents/ article/ other/ 57jn38.htm> 
accessed 15 August 2017.
11 See UN GA Res. 49/ 50 (1994).
12 See also the reference by the ICJ in the Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, para 30.
13 According to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use 
of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, states parties hold responsibility for chemical weapons 
that they abandon on the territory of another state party. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti- Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction does not contain 
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been made to inventory existing protections of the environment during armed con-
flict.14 But overall, responses remain fragmented and partial.
In humanitarian responses, protection of the natural environment is often at the 
periphery. Responsive action is at the core of humanitarian response— immediate 
action that aims to stop, prevent, or alleviate the worst and effects of abuse.15 Remedial 
action is less immediate, and is aimed at helping people recover and live with subse-
quent effects.16 Finally, environment- building action focuses on long- term efforts to 
rebuild societal structures and norms in order to prevent or limit current and future 
violations and abuses.17 Humanitarian action is predominantly focused on thematic 
issues, such as protection of civilians, sexual and gender- based violence, protection 
of children or cultural property. Environmental protection is generally not part of the 
immediate response (i.e. action to stop or alleviate violations), but at best part of long- 
term efforts to rebuild structures or prevent or limit future damage.
The role of non- state armed groups remains a bone of contention in legal discussions 
on conflict and environment.18 Incidents, such as the burning of oil wells by ISIS in 
Libya, Iraq, or Syria, highlight the risks that non- state actors may pose to the environ-
ment and health of civilians. But international law still lacks effective mechanisms and 
structures to deal with such types of destruction, due to ambiguity of environmental 
rules relating to non- international armed conflicts and lack of compliance systems.19 In 
addition, major powers have remained reluctant to accept environmental obligations 
or duties to prevent or remedy conflict- related harm.20
Existing legal frameworks differ in their approach towards environmental challenges. 
International humanitarian law is often the starting point. The existing regime has been 
criticized for its high threshold for environmental damage under Articles 35 and 55 of 
Additional Protocol I, (i.e. the requirement of ‘widespread, long- term and severe dam-
age’ to the environment under Additional Protocol I). As Karen Hulme has pointed 
out, these notions are considerably vague, and open to conflicting understandings by 
an express environmental impact assessment, but requires states parties to clear all mines in areas under 
their jurisdiction or control. Article 10 of the 1996 Amended Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions 
on the Use of Mines, Booby- Traps and Other Devices (annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively 
Injurious or Have Indiscriminate Effects) obliges states to clear, remove, or destroy minefields under their 
control. The Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War obliges a party to a conflict to assume responsibility for 
remnants of war in territory under their control and to provide assistance in relation to clearance, removal, 
or destruction, even in the absence of control.
14 Elizabeth Mrema, Carl E. Bruch, and Jordan Diamond, Protecting the Environment During Armed 
Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International Law (UNEP/ Earthprint, 2009).
15 Hugo Slim and Andrew Bonwick, Protection:  An ALNAP Guide for Humanitarian Agencies 
(London: Overseas Development Institute, 2005), 42.
16 ibid. 17 ibid.
18 See generally Claudia Hofmann and Ulrich Schneckener, ‘Engaging Non- state Armed Actors in State 
and Peace- Building: Options and Strategies’ (2011) 93 International Review of the Red Cross 603.
19 Only a limited number of non- state armed groups have agreed to specific environmental protections 
in their doctrines. See Jonathan Somer, ‘Environmental Protection and Non- State Armed Groups: Setting 
a Place at the Table for the Elephant in the Room’, at <http:// www.toxicremnantsofwar.info/ environmen-
tal- protection- and- non- state- armed- groups- setting- a- place- at- the- table- for- the- elephant- in- the- room/ > 
accessed 15 August 2017.
20 For instance, the US has called into question the customary nature of Rule 45 of the ICRC Customary 
Law Study which prohibits causing ‘serious damage to the natural environment’. See John B. Bellinger and 
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interpreters. Taken to its extreme, the term ‘widespread’ might be read to cover only 
damage that stretches over thousands of kilometres. The notion of ‘long term’ could 
imply a period of several decades, rather than months or years. The requirement of 
severity might require significant impact on human life.21
Protection of the environment per se remains an exception. While certain multilat-
eral environment agreements (e.g. the Convention Concerning the Protection of the 
World Cultural and Natural Heritage) protect the environment per se (e.g. biodiver-
sity), international humanitarian law and international criminal law continue to treat 
environmental protection largely from an anthropocentric perspective. They address 
environmental protection mostly through the lens of property protection (e.g. owner-
ship of natural resources), and precautions in attack or pursuit of military objectives 
(principles of necessity and proportionality). Different approaches to the environment 
can be found within the same document. Article 35 of the 1977 Additional Protocol 
I22 is more ecocentric, while Article 55 is more anthropocentric— valuing the natural 
environment not necessarily for its own sake but because damage to the natural envi-
ronment may ‘prejudice the health or survival of the population’. This anthropocentric 
framework is the norm in the law of armed conflict. Like Aldo Leopold, contributors to 
this volume emphasize environmental integrity and stability as fundamental criteria to 
evaluate the effectiveness of efforts to preserve the environment and stabilize the peace.
The acceptance of specific ecological obligations and procedures in post- conflict 
environments continues to encounter resistance. It is only gradually recognized that a 
comprehensive understanding of the nexus between environment and conflict requires 
not only efforts to protect the environment as such, but a deeper engagement with the 
origins of conflicts and a better connection with peacebuilding strategies.23
Traditional approaches face particular challenges in transitions. There is a high degree 
of norm diffusion. Protection of the environment and natural resources needs to be 
William J. Haynes, ‘A US Government Response to the International Committee of the Red Cross Study 
Customary International Humanitarian Law’ (2007) 89 International Review of the Red Cross 443, 455– 60.
21 See Hulme (n 2) 92– 6.
22 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. The relevant articles are:
Article 35. BASIC RULES.
1.  In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of 
warfare is not unlimited.
2.  It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature 
to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.
3.  It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, 
to cause widespread, long- term and severe damage to the natural environment.
Article 55. PROTECTION OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT.
1.  Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long- term 
and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of 
warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environ-
ment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population.
2. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited.
23 See David Jensen and Stephen Lonergan (eds.), Assessing and Restoring Natural Resources In Post- 
Conflict Peacebuilding (New  York:  Routledge, 2012); Carl Bruch, Carroll Muffett, and Sandra Nichols, 
Governance, Natural Resources and Post- Conflict Peacebuilding (New York: Routledge, 2015).
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considered in tandem with a broad range of simultaneously applicable frameworks, such 
as (i)  human rights, (ii) transitional justice,24 (iii) arms control/ disarmament, (iv) UN 
law and practice (sanctions, protection of natural resources, law of peace operations), 
(v) development, and (vi) domestic law. These bodies provide different perspectives on 
environmental protection. Environmental concerns may be protected through different 
lenses:  property protection, health, and environmental norms and principles.25 These 
frameworks complement each other and require coordination.26 The weight given to these 
rationales may shift according to the nature and intensity of the conflict and the progres-
sion towards the consolidation of peace, that is moves from the absence of violence to 
thicker versions of societal peace.27
Existing frameworks contain gaps and ambiguities in key areas, such as non- 
international armed conflict, the allocation of responsibility (e.g. ‘shared responsibility’,28 
or the responsibility of non- state actors such as private military contractors), and enforce-
ment. Many human rights instruments contain environmental protections.29 But there are 
often conflicting priorities in post- conflict settings that may require deviation from classi-
cal peacetime standards. A balance needs to be struck between strict liability approaches, 
supportive compliance mechanisms, and punitive approaches. Addressing immediate and 
long- term consequences of environmental damage in and after conflict raises novel ques-
tions about reparations.
I.2 Jus Post Bellum and Environmental Protection
The role of jus post bellum in relation to environmental protection has thus far gained 
limited attention in scholarship.30 The concept of jus post bellum has roots in just war 
24 Transitional justice is a contested term, but can be thought of as a ‘conception of justice associated 
with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive 
predecessor regimes’. See Ruti G. Teitel, ‘Transitional Justice Genealogy’ (2006) 16 Harvard Human Rights 
Journal 69, 69.
25 See Karen Hulme, ‘The ILC’s Work Stream on Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed 
Conflict’ (2016) 34 Questions in International Law 27, 33.
26 Each of them offers prospects to strengthen specific aspects of environmental protection (e.g. a ‘rights’- 
based approach to protection, standard- setting, environmental clean- up, remedies, and reparations), but 
also contains its inherent limitations.
27 On jus post bellum and peace, see Cécile Fabre, Cosmopolitan Peace (Oxford:  Oxford University 
Press, 2016); Mark Evans, ‘Just Peace: An Elusive Ideal’ in Eric Patterson (ed.), Ethics Beyond War’s End 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 197.
28 On ‘shared responsibility, see Andre Nollkaemper and Dov Jacobs, ‘Shared Responsibility in 
International Law: A Conceptual Framework’ (2013) 34 Michigan Journal of International Law 359.
29 For instance, Art. 24 of the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights states that ‘[a] ll peoples shall 
have the right to a general satisfactory environment favorable to their development’. See African Charter of 
Human and People’s Rights, (1982) 21 I.L.M. 58. The 1988 Additional Protocol to the American Convention 
on Human Rights reaffirms the ‘right to live in a healthy environment and to have access to basic public 
services’. Organization of American States, Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human 
Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, OASTS No. 69, 28 I.L.M. 161.
30 For an exception, see Douglas Lackey, ‘Postwar Environmental Damage: A Study in Jus Post Bellum’ in 
Larry May and Zachary Hoskins (eds.), International Criminal Law and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 141. In her Third Report, ILC Special Rapporteur Marie Jacobsson ‘has decided not 
to address the ongoing academic discussions on the concept of jus post bellum’ since the ‘legal- political dis-
cussion on this concept is wider than positive law and has a clear connection to just war theories’. See Marie 
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theory.31 It was traditionally linked to the assessment of the morality of war and inter-
vention in international society.32 But it is gaining increasing importance as a legal con-
cept through practice and law- making in different areas, such as peace treaties, peace 
operations, (post- )occupation law, international criminal justice, or statebuilding prac-
tice.33 Jus post bellum differs from jus contra bellum and the jus in bello.34 It is not 
only restrictive, but also permissive in nature, that is geared at facilitating and guiding 
‘choices’ in transitions. Like other fields, it has been primarily concerned with atrocity 
violence and human harm.35 It has traditionally neglected the environment or treated 
it as a low priority. This limited focus is open to critical scrutiny.
Environmental exploitation and harm is often not just a result of armed conflict, 
but one of its major causes. Studies about the interactions of human and natural sys-
tems show that environmental impact can have serious consequences for peacebuild-
ing.36 For instance, environmental damage caused by weapons, oil spills and destroyed 
landscapes, or killing of wildlife may impede health, return of internally displaced per-
sons, sustainable development, or social peace among societies affected conflict. Cymie 
Payne has thus convincingly argued in our first jus post bellum volume that environ-
mental integrity is an essential part of breaking cycles of conflict, restoring societies, 
and re- establishing the rule of law.37
G. Jacobsson, Special Rapporteur, Third Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed 
Conflicts, ILC Doc. A/ CN.4/ 700, 3 June 2016, para 10.
31 See, for example, Michael Walzer, Arguing About War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004); 
Brian Orend, War and International Justice: A Kantian Perspective (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 
2000), 57; Brian Orend, The Morality of War (Buffalo, New York: Broadview Press, 2006), 160– 90; Alex 
Bellamy, ‘The Responsibilities of Victory: Jus Post Bellum and the Just War’ (2008) 34 Review of International 
Studies 601; Mark Allman and Tobias Winright, After the Smoke Clears: The Just War Tradition and Post 
War Justice (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2010); Michael Walzer, ‘The Aftermath of War. Reflections on Jus 
Post Bellum’ in Eric Patterson (ed.), Ethics Beyond War’s End (Washington, DC: Georgetown University 
Press, 2012), 35.
32 On jus post bellum and judgment, see Jeremy Waldron, ‘Post Bellum Aspects of the Laws of Armed 
Conflict’ (2009) 31 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 31, 45– 55.
33 See Inger Österdahl and Esther van Zadel, ‘What Will Jus Post Bellum Mean: Of New Wine and Old 
Bottles’ (2009) 14 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 175; Adam Roberts, ‘Transformative Military 
Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights’ (2006) 100 American Journal of International 
Law 580; Kristen Boon, ‘Obligations of the New Occupier: The Contours of Jus Post Bellum’ (2009) 31 Loyola 
of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 57; Christine Bell, ‘Post- conflict Accountability 
and the Reshaping of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’ in Orna Ben- Naftali (ed.), International 
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011), 328, 369. See 
also the contributions in Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday, and Jens Iverson, Jus Post Bellum: Mapping 
the Normative Foundations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
34 On critiques of jus post bellum, see Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Law After War’ (2007) 8 Melbourne Journal 
of International Law 233; Eric De Brabandere, ‘The Responsibility for Post- Conflict Reforms: A Critical 
Assessment of Jus Post Bellum as a Legal Concept’ (2010) 43 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 119; 
Ruti Teitel, ‘Rethinking Jus Post Bellum in an Age of Global Transitional Justice’ (2013) 24 European Journal 
of International Law 335.
35 For a critique of the crisis narrative of international law, see Hilary Charlesworth, ‘International 
Law: A Discipline of Crisis’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 377.
36 UNEP, From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment (United 
Nations Environment Programme, 2009), at <http:// postconflict.unep.ch/ publications/ pcdmb_ policy_ 
01.pdf> accessed 15 August 2017.
37 See Cymie Payne, ‘The Norm of Environmental Integrity in Post- Conflict- Legal Regimes’ in Stahn, 
Easterday, and Iverson (n 33) 502.
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I.2.1 Notions of jus post bellum
This volume seeks to make the case that jus post bellum can have a useful role in relation 
to environmental protection. A  fundamental premise is that environmental damage 
needs to be considered independently from respect of jus ad bellum and jus in bello.38 
As we have set out in our previous research, the concept is inherently linked to the idea 
of sustainable peace.39 Some view it in a narrow sense, namely as a concept relating to 
the transition phase out of armed conflict, that is a phase that is separate from a com-
plete end to hostilities.40 We have understood it in a wider sense, namely not only as 
exit from conflict, but as a concept inherently connected to the establishment of peace. 
It pursues different macro purposes:
(i)  it may have a certain preventive function, by requiring actors to look into the 
consequences of action before, rather than ‘in’ and ‘after’ armed conflict;
(ii) it may serve as a constraint on violence in armed conflict; and
(iii) it may facilitate a succession to peace, rather than ‘exit’ from conflict.
In legal terms, the concept may be understood in at least three different ways. Jus post 
bellum may be said to form a system of norms and principles applicable to transitions 
from conflict to peace.41 This view is the most ambitious conception. Many jus post 
bellum norms are adaptations from existing bodies of law, or are derived from them. 
Process- related norms, flexible principles, and ‘soft law’ have particular importance, in 
light of the particular tensions raised in post- conflict settings.
A second and more ‘modest’ understanding of jus post bellum is its qualification as a 
‘framework’.42 This conception emphasizes the functionality of jus post bellum. Jus post 
bellum might be understood as an ‘ordering framework’, namely as an instrument to 
identify what rules and principles apply in post- conflict situations, to coordinate the 
application of laws, or to solve conflicts of norms or balance conflicting interests.
Thirdly, jus post bellum may constitute an interpretative device.43 The concept might 
inform a context- specific interpretation of certain normative concepts, such as ‘mil-
itary necessity’ or the principle of proportionality. For instance, the nexus between 
38 See also  chapter 16 in this volume. On the independence of jus post bellum from jus ad bellum and jus 
in bello, see Carsten Stahn,  “Jus ad bellum”, “jus in bello” . . . “jus post bellum?” – Rethinking the Conception 
of the Law of Armed Force’ (2007) 17 European Journal of International Law 921, 936; Carsten Stahn, ‘Das 
Ringen um den Frieden: Jus Ad Bellum, Jus Contra Bellum, Jus Post Bellum?’ in Andreas von Arnauld (ed.), 
Völkerrechtsgeschichte(n):  Historische Narrative und Konzepte im Wandel (Berlin:  Duncker & Humblot, 
2017), 147, 156– 7.
39 Jennifer S. Easterday, Jens Iverson, and Carsten Stahn, ‘Exploring the Normative Foundations of Jus 
Post Bellum: An Introduction’ in Stahn, Easterday, and Iverson (n 33) 1, 11.
40 On jus ex bello, see Darrel Mollendorf, ‘Jus ex Bello’ (2008) 16 Political Philosophy 123; Darrel 
Mollendorf, ‘Two Doctrines of Jus ex Bello’ (2015) 125 Ethics 653; David Rodin, ‘Two Emerging Issues 
of Jus Post Bellum:  War Termination and the Liability of Soldiers for Crimes of Aggression’ in Carsten 
Stahn and Jann Kleffner (eds.), Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition from Conflict to Peace (The 
Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2008), 53.
41 On this understanding see Carsten Stahn, ‘The Future of Jus Post Bellum’ in Stahn and Kleffner (n 40), 
231, 236– 7.
42 See Easterday, Iverson, and Stahn (n 39) 1, 2– 4.
43 See James Gallen, ‘Jus Post Bellum: An Interpretive Framework’ in Stahn, Easterday, and Iverson (n 
33) 58.
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environmental protection and peace might support a ‘green’ interpretation of concepts, 
such as proportionality, necessity, or distinction.
I.2.2 Implications in relation to environmental protection
As Larry May and others have shown, jus post bellum demands moderation, which 
derives from the need to end conflict in a sustainable way. 44 This may require conces-
sions, compromises, and a certain degree of renouncement, that is an openness by par-
ties to conflict to accept not only what is ‘owed’, but what can be reasonably demanded. 
This conception has a certain grounding in the principle of equity,45 which plays a 
prominent role in general international law and international environmental law.
These tensions, and in particular the need for moderation, communitarian 
approaches, and balancing of conflicting interests, are evident in the field of environ-
mental protection. The ‘optimal goal’ is, as the International Law Commission (‘ILC’) 
put it, to leave ‘no environmental footprints at all’.46 While optimal, this goal is nor-
mally not only impossible— even assessment of the extent of environmental harm can 
be difficult. During and after armed conflict, it is often hard to obtain reliable informa-
tion on the condition of the environment. Assessment of environmental harm is mostly 
only one among competing priorities. Contributions to the harm are often shared or 
clouded by scientific uncertainty. Certain forms of damage may unfold in slow motion 
and materialize only long after cessation of hostilities. Other forms of damage may be 
irreversible. It will often be impossible to restore the status quo ante.
The only remedy may be forward- looking, that is to strengthen system resilience.47 
Repair of harm may require a broader distribution of burden- sharing. For instance, 
environmental harm is often caused by cumulative effects. The principle ‘if you break it, 
you own it’48 is not necessarily most conducive to effective environmental protection. 
International environmental law is governed by the ‘polluter pays’ principle.49 This 
approach causes particular difficulty in civil wars or fragile states. Countries affected 
by armed violence or parties involved in non- international armed conflict may lack 
44 See Larry May, ‘Jus Post Bellum, Grotius and Meionexia’ in Stahn, Easterday, and Iverson (n 33), 15, 
21– 2. Steven J. Barela and Alexis Keller, ‘Justice, Peace and Jus Post Bellum’ (2015) 7 Amsterdam Law Forum 
98, 107, arguing that peacemaking requires recognition and certain degree of concession and compromise 
from parties involved (principle of renouncement).
45 On equity in international environmental law, see Dinah Shelton, ‘Equity’ in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta 
Brunnée, and Ellen Hey (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law 639; Philippe 
Cullet, ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities’ in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, David. M. Ong, and Panos 
Merkouris (eds.), Research Handbook on International Environmental Law (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2010), 161. 
On equity and jus post bellum in international investment law, see Jure Zrilič, ‘International Investment Law 
in the Context of Jus Post Bellum: Are Investment Treaties Likely to Facilitate or Hinder the Transition to 
Peace?’ (2015) 16 Journal of World Investment & Trade 604.
46 Jacobsson, Third Report (n 30) para 170.   47 See Payne,  chapter 2 in this volume.
48 See Dinah Shelton, ‘If You Break It, Do You Own It? Legal Consequences of Environmental Harm from 
Military Activities’ (2015) 6 Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies 201; George Clifford, ‘Jus 
Post Bellum: Foundational Principles and a Proposed Model’ (2012) 11 Journal of Military Ethics 42, 44; 
James Pattison, ‘Jus Post Bellum and the Responsibility to Rebuild’ (2015) 45 British Journal of Political 
Science 635, 638– 41.
49 The ‘polluter pays’ principle may be traced back to the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice. See PCIJ, Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow, PCIJ Series A, No. 9, 26 July 
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capacity to remedy harm caused, even if they are formally responsible for its causation. 
There is a risk that no one is effectively held liable for cumulative action.
Jus post bellum provides a potential framework to accommodate these tensions. It is 
in many ways an instrument to understand the functioning of norms, principles, and 
policies in a new way. It has essentially four different functions.
It offers, first of all, a lens to view environmental protection as continuum through-
out cycles of conflict or conflict transformations. Environmental concerns are relevant 
through all phases of conflict, ranging from pre- conflict stages to different phases of 
armed conflict, post- conflict transitions, and their aftermath. The perspective through 
which they are approached in these periods differ, depending on the underlying bodies 
of law. Jus post bellum provides a means to understand better how principles operate in 
these distinct phases. It allows a better distinction between different categories of prin-
ciples, and their interplay, such as (i) environment- related principles (e.g. sustainable 
development,50 intergenerational equity51), (ii) conflict or transition- related practices, 
(iii) organizing principles (e.g. rules of conflict, prioritization), and (iv) process- related 
principles (e.g. cooperation, sequencing).
Second, jus post bellum provides a fresh look at the operation of the principles of 
prevention52 and precaution.53 In traditional discourse, prevention and precaution are 
mostly related to classical peacetime or armed conflict. These two scenarios are often 
seen in isolation of each other. Jus post bellum provides an incentive to regard preven-
tion and precaution in more holistic way, namely as a prerogative in pre- conflict plan-
ning, ongoing conflict, periods of transition, and peacetime. These different phases are 
inherently connected. Jus post bellum strengthens, in particular, the argument that con-
cerns of environmental protection are not set aside by armed conflict54 but relevant 
throughout conflict and its aftermath— a finding supported by the jurisprudence of the 
International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) in the Nuclear Weapons Opinion55 and the prac-
tice of the ILC.56
Third, jus post bellum strengthens the case for due diligence of actors beyond armed 
conflict. Due diligence duties are inherent in international environmental law and 
1927. See generally Priscilla Schwartz, ‘The Polluter- Pays Principle’ in Fitzmaurice, Ong, and Merkouris 
(n 44) 243.
50 See Duncan French, ‘Sustainable Development’, in Fitzmaurice, Ong, and Merkouris (n 45) 51.
51 See Edith Brown Weiss, ‘Implementing intergenerational equity’, in Fitzmaurice, Ong, and Merkouris 
(n 45) 100.
52 The principle of prevention is related to the avoidance of harm that is known or foreseeable. See Arie 
Trouwhurst, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2002), 36– 7.
53 The precautionary principle includes risks arising from scientific uncertainty. ibid.
54 On the relationship between jus post bellum and jus in bello, see Inger Österdahl, ‘The Gentle 
Modernizer of Armed Conflict?’ in Stahn, Easterday, and Iverson (n 33) 207.
55 ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (n 12) para 33 (‘The Court thus finds that while the 
existing international law relating to the protection and safeguarding of the environment does not specifi-
cally prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, it indicates important environmental factors that are properly to 
be taken into account in the context of the implementation of the principles and rules of the law applicable 
in armed conflict’).
56 See ILC, Preliminary Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, 
ILC Doc. A.CN.4/ 674, 30 May 2014, para 2 (‘This work takes, at its starting point, the presumption that the 
existence of an armed conflict does not ipso facto terminate or suspend the operation of treaties’).
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international humanitarian law. Jus post bellum broadens the spectrum. It might involve 
a mandate to minimize harm that makes a peaceful post- conflict settlement impossi-
ble. Scholars have derived this imperative from the need to facilitate peace between 
warring factions.57 This argument applies with equal force to environmental considera-
tions, which constitute an impediment to sustainable peace. The mandate to protect the 
environment during and after conflict is inherently linked to the needs of future gen-
erations (‘intergenerational approach’). Legally, this due diligence under jus post bellum 
is best understood as an ‘obligation of conduct’, that is a duty to take reasonable steps 
towards this outcome, rather than an obligation of result.
Fourth, jus post bellum allows a differentiated look at the treatment of harm and 
remedies. In existing discourse on the morality of war, jus post bellum has been 
associated with a principle of rebuilding.58 The imperative to rebuild after conflict 
is mostly understood as a moral principle.59 It is clear that environmental damage 
must ‘be assessed against whomever caused it, regardless of who won or lost’.60 But 
the legal regime governing post- conflict liability and responsibility is more complex. 
States may bear responsibility for lawful and unlawful acts. Non- state actors may 
be held accountable under customary international law or domestic laws. Several 
conventions limit damage caused by armed conflict.61 It remains contested to what 
extent violations trigger strict liability.62 Contributions to the harm may originate 
from a wide of actors. One of the most difficult questions is to provide effective rem-
edies. Parties to a conflict, including non- state actors, may lack the means and know- 
how to restore environmental damage. Remedial action may have to be spread more 
widely than parties to a conflict. It relies on collective action, solidarity, and coopera-
tion, involving affected states, international organizations, NGOs, and local actors.63 
Reparation or compensation claims for harm may need to be organized through spe-
cialized procedures.
This special approach towards responsibility is sometimes referred to as ‘reme-
dial responsibility’.64 It distinguishes the responsibility of the agent for a specific out-
come from the responsibility to remedy harm through remedial action (‘remedial 
57 Larry May relates this to the principle of reconciliation, namely the ‘obligation to initiate and conduct 
war in such a way that one does not unduly antagonize the people with whom on will eventually have to 
reach a peaceful accord’. See Larry May, After War Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 21.
58 Alexandra Gheciu and Jennifer Welsh, ‘The Imperative to Rebuild: Assessing the Normative Case for 
Postconflict Reconstruction’ (2009) 23 Ethics & International Affairs 121; Lonneke Peperkamp, ‘On the 
Duty to Reconstruct After War: Who is Responsible for Jus Post Bellum?’ (2016) XXIX Canadian Journal of 
Law & Jurisprudence 403.
59 See generally Larry May and Andrew Forcehimes (eds.), Morality, Jus Post Bellum, and International 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
60 Lackey (n 30) 141, 148. 61 See Jacobsson, Third Report (n 30) para 110 et seq.
62 See Toxic Remnants of War Project (n 5) 41 (‘It could be argued that as conflict and military activities 
are inherently risky for the environment, parties to a conflict should also bear some responsibility for dam-
age, whether intentional or not’). Strict liability approaches have been applied in relation to oil transporta-
tion and nuclear industries.
63 See also Peperkamp (n 58) 429 (‘The “belligerents rebuilt thesis” must therefore be understood in a 
more nuanced way than it initially appeared: belligerents are not solely responsible. If they cannot bear the 
duty to reconstruct themselves, other actors are remedially responsible instead’).
64 David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2007), 
15– 16; David Miller, ‘Distributing Responsibilities’ (2001) 9 Journal of Political Philosophy 453.
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responsibility’). It is reflected in certain recent disarmament instruments. Both, the 
Anti- Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions 
decouple clearance obligations from user responsibility. For instance, Article 4(4) of 
the Convention on Cluster Munitions ‘strongly encourage[s] ’ states parties that used 
weapons to support host states in the destruction and clearance of cluster munitions.65 
But ultimately, the host state is bound to ensure clearance, irrespective of who used 
the weapons on its territory.66 Responsibility is thus tied to jurisdiction and control. 
This approach is deemed to strengthen the protection of civilians after the cessation of 
hostilities.
I.3 The ILC Draft Principles on the Protection of  
the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts
Some fundamental aspects of the regime governing environmental protection in tran-
sitions from conflict to peace have been addressed by the ILC in its study on the ‘pro-
tection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts’, guided by Special Rapporteur 
Marie Jacobsson.67
The 2016 ILC draft principles break new ground since they extend the scope of consid-
eration of environmental protection beyond armed conflict. The ILC decided early on to 
adopt a holistic approach which includes not only protection during peacetime and armed 
conflict, but also the aftermath of conflict, and certain general principles covering all phases. 
The third report examines principles applying in the post- conflict phase.68 The ILC draft 
principles thus venture in post bellum terrain which differs partly from classical peacetime. 
This is an achievement in itself, because it signals that environmental damage should not 
simply be accepted as a ‘silent casualty’ of conflict in the aftermath of hostilities.69
The draft principles suggested by the ILC are in many ways marked by compromise, 
and in no way complete in coverage. But they reflect important trends and new insights. 
The ILC takes a dynamic approach towards the understanding of the environment and 
its ecosystems. It acknowledges that ‘environmental considerations cannot remain static 
over time, they should develop as human understanding of the environment develops’.70
The notion of principles as such triggered a rich debate.71 Some members expressed 
a preference for draft articles, which would lend themselves to codification. But 
65 Art. 4(4) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
66 Art. 4(1) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
67 See Michael Bothe, ‘The ILC’s Special Rapporteur’s Preliminary Report on the Protection of the 
‘Environment in Relation to Armed Conflict: An Important Step in the Right Direction’ in Pia Acconci 
et al., (eds), International Law and the Protection of Humanity. Essays in Honor of Flavia Latanzi (Leiden/ 
Boston: Brill, 2017), 213– 24.
68 Jacobsson, Third Report (n 30) para 17.
69 See in this sense, Guilio Bartolini and Marco Pertile, ‘The Work of the ILC on the Environment 
and Armed Conflicts: Enhancing Protection for the “Silent Victims of Warfare”?’ (2016) 34 Question of 
International Law 1, 4.
70 See Report of the ILC, Sixty- eighth session (2 May– 10 June and 4 July– 12 August 2016), A/ 71/ 10, 336.
71 See Report of the ILC, Sixty- seventh session (4 May– 5 June and 6 July– 7 August 2015), A/ 70/ 10, 108, 
para 146.
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ultimately, the more flexible concept of principles was retained. The principles are 
important from a jus post bellum perspective in several ways.
A first important contribution is the desire to strengthen environmental protection 
in the planning and legal framework of military and peace operations. Jus post bellum 
contains a nucleus of norms and principles in UN law and the law of military opera-
tions.72 Many contemporary operations, such Iraq, Afghanistan, or Libya have been 
criticized for a lack of appropriate mandating or planning. Jus post bellum scholars have 
argued that existing frameworks should contain a clearer pre- commitment to assess 
consequences of the use of force on post- conflict situations.73 Some have called for a 
jus ante bellum.74 The 2016 ILC draft principles strengthen prevention in military and 
peace operations before the operation. For instance, draft principle 7 encourages states 
and international organizations to include provisions concerning environmental pro-
tection, including ‘preventive measures, impact assessments, restoration and clean- up 
measures’ in agreements concerning the presence of military forces.75 Draft principle 
8 mandates (‘shall’) states and international organizations involved in peace operations 
to ‘consider the impact of such operations on the environment and take appropriate 
measures to prevent, mitigate and remediate the negative environmental consequences 
thereof ’. These principles are complemented by a general clause which highlights the 
aim to enhance the protection of the environment not only in pre- conflict phase, but 
also during armed conflict and after armed conflict.76 Although the ILC draft princi-
ples are framed in ‘soft language’ (‘should, as appropriate’; ‘shall consider’), they serve 
as an important check for practices.
Second, the ILC draft principles clarify duties in armed conflict. The work of ILC is 
guided by the objective to strengthen the protection of the environment during armed 
conflict, rather than merely re- stating existing rules under international humanitarian 
law. This is reflected in draft principle 2.77 One of the most important developments 
lies in the approach towards the protection of the environment during armed conflict. 
The draft principles do not expressly differentiate between the legal regime governing 
72 See Dieter Fleck, ‘Jus Post Bellum as a Partly Independent Legal Framework’ in Stahn, Easterday, and 
Iverson (n 33) 43, 48, 50.
73 See Brian Orend, Michael Walzer on War and Justice (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000), 137– 9, 
190; Analisa Koeman, ‘A Realistic and Effective Constraint on the Resort to Force? Pre- commitment to 
Jus in Bello and Jus Post Bellum as Part of the Criterion of Right Intention’ (2007) 6 Journal of Military 
Ethics 198.
74 Garrett Wallace Brown and Alexandra Bohm, ‘Introducing Jus ante Bellum as a Cosmopolitan 
Approach to Humanitarian Intervention’ (2016) 22 European Journal of International Relations 897– 919.
75 It reads: ‘States and international organizations should, as appropriate, include provisions on environ-
mental protection in agreements concerning the presence of military forces in relation to armed conflict. 
Such provisions may include preventive measures, impact assessments, restoration and clean- up measures.’
76 Principle 4 (Measures to enhance the protection of the environment) reads:  ‘1. States shall, pursu-
ant to their obligations under international law, take effective legislative, administrative, judicial and other 
measures to enhance the protection of the environment in relation to armed conflict. 2. In addition, States 
should take further measures, as appropriate, to enhance the protection of the environment in relation to 
armed conflict.’
77 It reads: ‘The present draft principles are aimed at enhancing the protection of the environment in rela-
tion to armed conflict, including through preventive measures for minimizing damage to the environment 
during armed conflict an through remedial measures.’
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international and non- international armed conflict.78 They follow thus, to some extent, 
the famous critique of the distinction, formulated in Tadić:  ‘What is inhumane, and 
consequently proscribed, in international wars, cannot but be inhumane and inadmis-
sible in civil strife’.79 As highlighted in several contributions in this volume, they treat 
the environment largely as a civilian object on warfare80 and expand protection, by cat-
egorically excluding reprisals against the natural environment under all circumstances, 
including non- international armed conflict.81
As argued by UNEP, distinction, necessity, and proportionality under international 
humanitarian law ‘may not be sufficient to limit damage to the environment’.82 The ILC 
draft principles reflect this consideration. Draft principle 9 contains a general duty to 
respect and protect the natural environment in accordance with both, ‘applicable inter-
national law’, and ‘in particular the law of armed conflict’.83 Draft principle 10 specifies 
that the rules and principles governing ‘distinction, proportionality, military necessity 
and precautions in attack’ shall be ‘applied to the natural environment, with a view to its 
protection’.84 The ILC also recognized a general duty of care to ‘protect the natural envi-
ronment against widespread, long- term and severe damage’85 and a duty not to attack 
any part of it, ‘unless it has become a military objective’.86 The duty of care is derived 
from Article 55 of Additional Protocol I. It clarifies that the environment is protected 
per se, even in the absence of human harm. According to the explanation of the ILC, it 
involves a ‘duty on the parties to an armed conflict to be vigilant of the potential impact 
that military activities can have on the natural environment’.87 The draft principles also 
enhance protection, by requiring states to ‘designate, by agreement or otherwise, areas 
of major environmental and cultural importance as protected zones’.88 The term ‘major 
environmental importance’ was discussed at previous occasions, but it is novel in the 
context of the law of armed conflict. The wording closes an important gap left in the 
negotiation of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.89
Third, the ILC draft principles reinforce post- conflict protection. They acknowledge 
that post- conflict construction requires a communitarian effort that goes beyond the 
parties to a conflict. Draft principle 14 goes to the heart of jus post bellum.90 It states 
that ‘[p] arties to an armed conflict should, as part of the peace process, including where 
appropriate in peace agreements, address matters relating to the restoration and pro-
tection of the environment damaged by the conflict’. This principle recognizes the car-
dinal importance of the link between peacebuilding and environmental protection. It 
bears some synergies with Immanuel Kant’s famous dictum in Perpetual Peace accord-
ing to which peace agreements should avoid clauses that carry the seeds for the out-
break of further wars.91
78 See also Stavros- Evdokomos Pantazopoulos, ‘Protection of the Environment During Armed 
Conflicts: An Appraisal of the ILC’s Work’ (2016) 43 Questions in International Law 7, 9.
79 Prosecutor v. Tadić (n 3) para 119. 80 See  chapters 10 and 17 in this volume.
81 See ILC draft principle 12. 82 See UNEP (n 9) 52. 83 ILC draft principle 9(1).
84 Emphasis added. 85 ILC draft principle 9(2). 86 ILC draft principle 9(3).
87 Jacobsson (n 30) 329.   88 ILC draft principle 5, as well as draft principle 13.
89 Jacobsson (n 30) 324.
90 On jus post bellum and law of peace, see Christine Bell, ‘Of Jus Post Bellum and Lex Pacificatoria: What’s 
in a Name?’ in Stahn, Easterday, and Iverson (n 33) 181.
91 Immanuel Kant, Traktat zum Ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf, 1795, Erster Präliminarartikel.
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The principle reflects a trend to address environmental protection in peace agree-
ments. The language encompasses both international armed conflicts and non- 
international armed conflicts. Moreover, the generic use of the term ‘parties’ suggests 
that the principle applies not only to states but also to non- state actors.92 This formula-
tion marks an important acknowledgment of the obligations of non- state actors under 
international law. But it triggered considerable debate. Some members felt the scope of 
the provision should be limited to international armed conflicts, since the recognition 
the obligations of non- state actors ‘similar to those of States’ might legitimize their sta-
tus.93 Others stated that such a limitation would be at odds which the realities of armed 
conflicts which are predominantly non- international in nature.94
Draft principle 14 specifies that ‘[r] elevant international organizations should, where 
appropriate, play a facilitating role in this regard’. Such a role is key in light of the real-
ities of conflict which may impede cooperation between former belligerents. Some 
scholars have even gone a step further and argued that the ‘collective, international 
duty to rebuild’ should be assigned primarily according to ‘the agent’s ability to rebuild’, 
rather than the legal duties of parties involved in conflict.95 This vision would require 
significant investment in institutions and protection mechanisms, in cases where par-
ties are unwilling or unable to take action. Draft principle 15 seeks to strengthen resto-
ration, remediation, and recovery. It encourages international cooperation in order to 
carry out environmental damage assessments and remedy harm.96
Fourth, the ILC principles promote ‘sustainable exit’ from conflict. They contain a 
range of provisions to deal with the removal of harm. The most prominent one is the 
treatment of toxic and hazardous remnants of war. Draft principle 16 provides that 
‘[a] fter an armed conflict, parties to the conflict shall seek to remove or render harmless 
toxic and hazardous remnants of war under their jurisdiction or control that are causing 
or risk causing damage to the environment’. The wording (‘shall seek to’) makes it clear 
that it is an obligation of conduct. It complements existing ‘obligations under interna-
tional law to clear, remove, destroy or maintain minefields, mined areas, mines, booby- 
traps, explosive ordnance and other devices’.97 The terms ‘party to a conflict’ includes 
non- state actors. The draft principle goes thus further than traditional approaches, 
which would rely primarily on state obligations under human rights or international 
environmental law.98 The Commentary of the ILC suggests that this covers areas within 
de jure and de facto control.99 This approach was partly criticized as being overambi-
tious in its endeavour to include non- state actors in removal activities.100 The principle 
is phrased in a progressive way since it links the obligation expressly to environmental 
harm as such, rather than harm to humans and property alone.
92 See Hulme (n 25) 37– 8.   93 Jacobsson (n 30) 313, para 167.   94 ibid.
95 See Pattison (n 48) 635.
96 It reads:  ‘Cooperation among relevant actors, including international organizations, is encouraged 
with respect to post- armed conflict environmental assessments and remedial measures’. ON UNEP’s role, 
see ILC, Third Report (n 30) paras. 174– 84.
97 See Jacobsson draft principle 16(3).   98 Hulme (n 25) 37.
99 See Protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts Statement of the Chairman of the 
Drafting Committee, Mr. Pavel Šturma, 9 August 2016, 14.
100 See Jacobsson (n 30) 315, para 171 (‘some members expressed the view that such responsibility should 
remain with the State having effective jurisdiction and relevant international organizations; it would be 
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The ILC’s notes of cautious optimism are worth reiterating:
[T] here exists a substantive collection of legal rules that enhances environmental pro-
tection in relation to armed conflict. However, if taken as a whole, this collection of laws 
is a blunt tool, since its various parts sometimes seem to work in parallel streams. . . .
[T] he law that is relevant for the protection of the environment in relation to armed 
conflict has continued to grow and mature through practice, opinio juris, case law and 
treaties. The role of international organizations such as the United Nations, UNEP and 
UNESCO in this context is considerable. Environmental considerations have become 
part of the mainstream, and this is particularly notable when one looks at how differ-
ent the situation was a decade or more ago.101
This cautious optimism regarding the development of the law in this area is well 
founded. Traditional legal approaches to protection face particular challenges during 
and after conflict. The overall aim of this volume is to help move environmental con-
siderations from the periphery of to the core of the effort to respond to armed conflict 
and build a just and sustainable peace.
I.4 Content of the Book
This book is partly more narrow, and partly broader than the ILC study. It investigates 
how a jus post bellum approach to environmental protection can improve peacebuild-
ing practices. It draws on multiple bodies of law to examine environmental protection 
in transitions from conflict to peace, including UN law, human rights, the law of occu-
pation, and disarmament. It approaches environmental damage through the lens of 
multiple perspectives: property considerations (e.g. ownership over natural resources), 
health, and environmental concerns. Each of these lenses raises distinct dilemmas in 
relation to the sustainability and justice of peace.
I.4.1 Context
The opening chapter by Carl Bruch places developments challenges into context. 
Bruch shows that existing law is characterized by a patchwork of provisions and mech-
anisms.102 He argues that jus post bellum can and should put protection of the natural 
environment at its core in instances where such protection is critical to the creation of a 
just and sustainable transition to peace. The ILC draft principles largely avoided dealing 
with the environment as a cause of conflict. Bruch illustrates that natural resources can 
be critical for positive contributions to the economy and food security, or for financ-
ing further conflict. He therefore supports a broader jus post bellum approach which 
includes considerations of the root causes of conflict. Bruch argues that practice is an 
unrealistic to expect non- State actors involved in the armed conflict to carry out the measures envisaged in 
the draft principle’).
101 Jacobsson (n 30) paras. 266, 268.
102 See also generally Carl Bruch, Marion Boulicault, Shuchi Talati, and David Jensen, ‘International Law, 
Natural Resources and Post‐conflict Peacebuilding: From Rio to Rio+20 and Beyond’ (2012) 21 Review of 
European Community and International Environmental Law 44.
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essential touchstone for any analysis of jus post bellum and the environment. Ultimately, 
the law governing the transition to peace may often be more facilitative than restrictive, 
leaving a space for a politics of environmental peacebuilding.
Cymie Payne addresses the fundamental question of the definition of ‘the environ-
ment’. In the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the ICJ 
stated that ‘the environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the 
quality of life and the very health of human beings, including generations unborn’.103 
None of the major in bello regulations of the natural environment, such as ENMOD, 
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (AP I), Articles 35(3), 55, 
or the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Article 8(2)(b)(iv)) define the 
environment as such. Provisions in the law of armed conflict are mostly anthropocen-
tric104 or refer to the ‘natural environment’, in distinction to the ‘human environment’. 
The ILC offered a broader approach in its principles on the allocation of loss in the 
case of transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activities. It formulated a ‘work-
ing definition’ of the environment which ‘includes natural resources, both abiotic and 
biotic, such as air, water, soil, fauna and flora and the interaction between the same fac-
tors, and the characteristic of their landscape’.105 In her contribution, Payne suggests to 
adopt an ‘integrity’ driven approach, which takes into account the collective interest, 
the context, the role of change, and interactivity of the environment during and after 
varied armed conflicts. She claims that jus post bellum should be aimed at improving 
system resilience, biodiversity, and evolutionary potential in situations where historical 
condition may not be recoverable.
I.4.2 Normative frameworks
The second part of the book analyses the legal and normative frameworks that govern 
the protection of the environment and natural resources in the transition from armed 
conflict to peace. They include international environmental law (‘IEL’) and multilateral 
environmental treaties, specific areas of public international law such as UN law, state 
responsibility, international humanitarian law and human rights law, as well as domes-
tic law. Contributions discuss not only positive law and lex lata, but also policies and 
practices.
A healthy environment is a pre- condition for sustainable peacebuilding. Chapters 3 
and 4 explore how international treaty law and environmental law come into play in 
situations from conflict to peace. Britta Sjöstedt argues that environmental treaties have 
the ability to fill an institutional and a normative gap in a post- conflict context, which 
103 ICJ (n 12) para 29. 104 See above (n 22).
105 ILC, Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of 
Hazardous Activities, with Commentaries, 2006, draft principle 2(b), at <http:// legal.un.org/ ilc/ texts/ instru-
ments/ english/ commentaries/ 9_ 10_ 2006.pdf> accessed 15 August 2017. The ILC notes: ‘Environment 
could be defined in a restricted way, limiting it exclusively to natural resources, such as air, soil, water, 
fauna and flora, and their interaction. A broader definition could embrace environmental values also. The 
Commission has opted to include in the definition the latter encompassing non- service values such as aes-
thetic aspects of the landscape also. This includes the enjoyment of nature because of its natural beauty and 
its recreational attributes and opportunities associated with it.’ ibid. 133.
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is often characterized by institutional collapse and low priority of environmental pro-
tection work. Many environmental treaties have treaty bodies that can ensure that the 
treaties apply to protect the environment. Sjöstedt claims that such bodies fill impor-
tant functions in post- conflict settings. She illustrates this argument by the application 
of the World Heritage Convention in relation to the armed conflicts taking place in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (‘DRC’).106 She shows that the treaty bodies estab-
lished under the World Heritage Convention have provided various means to protect 
the natural World Heritage Sites in the case of the DRC.
Kirsten Stefanik examines the role of general principles in conflict and post- conflict 
settings, and in particular the function of environmental principles,107 such as inter-
generational equity and the precautionary principle. She argues that principles of inter-
national environmental law provide necessary nuance to military decision- makers in 
the application of existing jus in bello protections for civilians and the environment. 
Stefanik shows that environmental destruction and degradation during conflict can 
and must be minimized, but that there must be equal recognition of the significant 
adverse impacts of environmental insecurity and the need for the ongoing application 
of principles of international environmental law in the transition to peace. She claims 
that peace arrangements and truth and reconciliation processes can provide a mecha-
nism for continuing attention to environmental remediation and protection.
Chapter 6 addresses the role of human rights and transitional justice in the post- war 
environmental context.108 Karen Hulme explores to what extent the human right to a 
healthy environment and other economic, social, and cultural rights might require the 
remedying and management of environmental resources, water resources, and agri-
cultural areas. It clearly recognized that human rights law includes obligations relating 
to the environment.109 But states often sideline human rights during peacebuilding, 
emphasizing instead ‘rule of law’ as a less contentious approach.110 Hulme argues that 
the potential of human rights mechanisms to improve environmental protections in 
post- conflict settings remains partly unexplored. She draws upon practice of transi-
tional justice, which has had a mixed history of upholding such survival rights. She 
claims that a combined human rights and environmental approach to peacebuilding 
could strengthen obligations to undertake environmental clean- up and restoration, 
provide mechanisms to review state actions and ensure environmental remediation, 
106 See also Britta Sjöstedt, ‘The Role of Multilateral Environmental Agreements in Armed Conflict: 
“Green- keeping” in Virunga National Park: Applying the UNESCO World Heritage Convention in the 
Armed Conflict of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (2013) 82 Nordic Journal of International Law 
129.
107 On general principles, see Philippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel, Principles of International Environmental 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3rd edn, 2012).
108 On the environment and human rights, see Linda Hajjar Leib, Human Rights and the 
Environment: Philosophical, Theoretical and Legal Perspectives (Leiden: Brill/ Martinus Nijhoff, 2010).
109 Human rights law fosters public availability of environmental information, public participation in 
environmental decision- making, and access to legal remedies. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environ-
ment, A/ HRC/ 31/ 53, 28 December 2015.
110 Balakrishnan Rajagopal, ‘Invoking The Rule Of Law In Post- Conflict Rebuilding:  A  Critical 
Examination’ (2007– 2008) 49 William & Mary Law Review 1345, 1357.
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and highlight broader ‘structural violence’ issues of environmental justice in the allo-
cation and use of natural resources. She cautions at the same time against some of 
the tensions inherent in a predominantly human- rights- oriented approach, such as its 
inevitably anthropocentric nature and its risks of politicizing discourse.
Olivia Radics and Carl Bruch focus on two of the most direct impacts of armed 
conflict on the environment: pillage and conflict resources.111 They argue that ‘preda-
tory natural resource exploitation’ can destroy the chances for a successful transition 
to peace, both in conflict and its immediate aftermath, and also make a peace unjust, 
as unbalanced resource contracts creating ‘booty futures’ can lead to the continuation 
of exploitative practices in the post- conflict period. Drawing on international criminal 
law and occupation law, they show that the law of pillage presents an as- yet underuti-
lized tool for addressing conflict resources. They claim that classical trials need to be 
combined with alternative avenues for accountability and prevention, including sanc-
tions, in order to enhance just and responsible resource management.
Daniëlla Dam- de Jong builds on Radics’ and Bruch’s focus on pillage to develop a 
broader analysis of the standards developed by the United Nations Security Council 
for the management of natural resources and the application of those standards to the 
transition to peace.112 She examines whether such standards are mandatory or merely 
hortatory, drawing out where the standards are voluntary and the particular instances 
where they are tied to sanctions and are thus mandatory. She also addresses key issues 
such as the preference for particular systems set up not by states but by third par-
ties such as the Kimberley Process for the Certification of Rough Diamonds. More 
fundamentally, Dam- de Jong questions whether the United Nations Security Council 
is the appropriate body to bind states in this area, particularly given the Principle of 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, which provides that states have the 
right to freely dispose of their natural resources.
Ayṣe- Martina Böhringer and Thilo Marauhn investigate the underexplored rela-
tionship between arms control law and environmental law in post- conflict environ-
ments. They argue that the regime of the Chemical Weapons Convention113 and 
bilateral agreements need to be complemented by general principles of international 
environmental law, in order to deal with the environmental implications of chemi-
cal disarmament, such as transport of weapons and war material for the purpose of 
destruction, elimination, and conversion. One example is the prohibition to cause 
significant transboundary environmental harm (‘no harm’ principle).114 It includes 
111 On pillaging, see also Larissa van den Herik and Daniella Dam- de Jong, ‘Revitalizing the Antique 
War Crime of Pillage: The Potential and Pitfalls of Using International Criminal Law to Address Illegal 
Resource Exploitation During Armed Conflict’ (2011) 22 Criminal Law Forum 237.
112 See generally Daniella Dam- de Jong, International Law and Governance of Natural Resources in 
Conflict and Post- Conflict Situations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
113 See generally Thilo Marauhn, ‘The Prohibition to Use Chemical Weapons’ (2014) 17 Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian Law 25.
114 The principle of ‘no harm’ goes back to the Trail Smelter case and is widely recognized as customary 
international law. Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration states:  ‘States have, in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their 
own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities 
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procedural aspects,115 such as the duty of consultation, exchange of information, early 
warning, and the assessment of potential transboundary impacts of projects at the 
domestic level. Drawing on insights from the situation in Syria, the authors claim that 
environmentally sound destruction of chemical weapons becomes complex in con-
flict and post- conflict situations, since it is often compromised by ongoing violence or 
resurgence of civil war.
Dieter Fleck examines the particular challenge of protecting the environment in the 
aftermath of a non- international armed conflict. He starts with an admission of the 
limitations in the law to limit environmental damage in relation to armed conflict. In 
Rule 44 of its Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, the ICRC stated 
that ‘[m] ethods and means of warfare must be employed with due regard to the protec-
tion and preservation of the natural environment’.116 The ICRC study found that Rule 
44 ‘arguably’ applies also during non- international armed conflicts, ‘if there are effects 
in another State’.117 Fleck argues that this ‘due regard’ standard should be understood 
as an obligation of conduct, namely an obligation to show concern for environmen-
tal effects of their military operations, and to minimize such effects not only in view 
of transboundary damage, but also within the territory of operations. This requires 
responsible planning and precautions in attack, taking in account the technical, eco-
nomic, and financial capacities available at the time. Fleck also shows that reparation 
issues deserve more attention. The obligation to repair losses and damage caused by 
breaches of the jus in bello includes damage caused by breaches of environmental obli-
gations. But liability may be limited or excluded during armed conflicts for injurious 
consequences of acts not prohibited by international law. Measures towards a sustain-
able recovery of the natural environment may thus depend on approaches under jus 
post bellum, including cooperation and assistance by third parties.
Matthew Gillett examines to what extent norms under international criminal law 
protect the environment during and after conflict.118 He identifies discrepancies 
between protections in international armed conflict and non- international armed con-
flict. For example, the Rome Statute prohibits ‘[i] ntentionally launching an attack in the 
knowledge that such attack will cause . . . widespread, long- term and severe damage to 
the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete 
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.’
115 See generally Phoebe N. Okowa, ‘Procedural Obligations in International Environmental Agreements’ 
(1996) 67 British Yearbook of International Law 275.
116 See ICRC, Rule 44, at <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule44> 
accessed 15 August 2017.
117 In its explanation, the ICRC notes: ‘This argument is based on the recognition by the International 
Court of Justice that safeguarding a State’s ecological balance was an “essential interest” and its finding that 
States’ obligation to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of 
other States or areas beyond national control were part of customary international law.’ ibid.
118 See generally Fréderic Mégret, ‘The Problem of an International Criminal Law of the Environment’ 
(2011) Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 195; Mark A. Drumbl, ‘Waging War against the World: The 
Need to Move from War Crimes to Environmental Crimes’ in Austin and Bruch (n 2)  620– 46; Tara 
Weinstein, ‘Prosecuting Attacks That Destroy the Environment: Environmental Crimes or Humanitarian 
Atrocities?’ (2004– 2005) 17 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 697– 722. On ecocide, 
see Lynn Berat, ‘Defending the Right to a Healthy Environment: Toward a Crime of Geocide in International 
Law’ (1993) 11 Boston University International Law Journal 327.
20 Introduction: Some Preliminary Reflections
and direct overall military advantage anticipated’119 during an international armed 
conflict, but not during a non- international armed conflict.120 Gillett argues that this 
gap calls for redress. He questions whether customary international law already con-
tains a full- fledged criminal prohibition of disproportionate environmental harm in 
non- international armed conflict. He claims existing norms provide a space to pros-
ecute environmental damage indirectly under anthropocentric provisions. But such 
convictions may be of limited expressive effect in relation to environmental values. He 
argues that the adoption of a prohibition against environmental harm in the context of 
non- international armed conflict would provide a valuable provision of jus post bellum.
I.4.3 Particular dilemmas and sites of contestation
The third part of the book addresses specific dilemmas that require further attention. 
Environmental harm is typically caused by a diversity of different actors, ranging from 
foreign interveners, to government forces, armed groups, or private actors. This raises 
complex issues in relation to responsibility and liability. For example, environmental 
damage in armed conflict poses complex problems in relation to the determination of 
shared responsibility. Corporate activities are under- regulated and can contribute to 
severe environmental degradation, even while promoted for the sake of development. 
Contributions assembled in the third part of the book identify gaps and blind spots in 
contemporary laws and policies, and potential practices to address them.
As Dieter Fleck has argued earlier, jus post bellum requires pragmatic limitation, con-
ciliation, and participation.121 This poses challenges for reparation of environmental 
damage. Ilias Plakokefalos discusses legal problems arising in the sharing of responsi-
bility for violations with a nexus to armed conflict.122 He identifies numerous limita-
tions in this area connected with the nature of multilateral environmental agreements. 
Multilateral environmental agreements occasionally explicitly exclude the possibility of 
being applied in times of armed conflict, although most are silent on the subject. More 
fundamentally, such agreements do not pose obligations to non- state actors. In the case 
where environmental damage is caused by multiple states during armed conflict, the 
basic approach (as observed by the ILC) is independent responsibility for the entire 
damage when the injury is not causally divisible. Only when an injury caused by multi-
ple states is causally divisible may compensation be proportionally reduced. Given the 
interconnected nature of environmental damage, complex or long- lasting armed con-
flict involving multiple states may carry with it broad and weighty claims of reparation. 
Plakokefalos shows that in its practice, the United Nations Compensation Commission 
(‘UNCC’) took a ‘middle ground’ between the principle of full reparation supported by 
the ILC and the exception according to which reparation may be adjusted.
119 Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute.
120 See on this also Carl Bruch, ‘All’s Not Fair in (Civil) War:  Criminal Liability for Environmental 
Damage in Internal Armed Conflict’ (2001) 25 Vermont Law Review 695.
121 Dieter Fleck, ‘Jus Post Bellum as a Partly Independent Legal Framework’ in Stahn, Easterday, and 
Iverson (n 33) 43, 56– 7.
122 See generally André Nollkaemper and Ilias Plakokefalos (eds.), The Principles of Shared Responsibility 
in International Law: An Appraisal of the State of the Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
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Jennifer S. Easterday and Hana Ivanhoe focus on the threat environmental degrad-
ation poses to a sustainable peace in the aftermath of armed conflict. They argue that 
environmental safeguards need to be a core part of an economic recovery plan, espe-
cially when related to the use of natural resources. They propose an expansion of the 
Ruggie Framework on Business and Human Rights123 to explicitly refer to peacebuild-
ing environments. Key tenets of corporate social responsibility, as articulated in the 
Ruggie Framework and elsewhere, such as human rights due diligence and non- judicial 
grievance mechanisms, are important in reducing the threat environmental degrad-
ation poses to a fragile peace. Easterday and Ivanhoe emphasize that peacebuilders 
need to take the opportunity to work with private corporations to ensure environmen-
tal and social safeguards in development projects that could otherwise lead to a resur-
gence of the conflict. This may be done through domestic government regulation as 
well as external pathways, such as soft law norms and corporate social responsibility 
standards in loan and financing agreements.
Private security companies, private military security contractors, and private secu-
rity service providers (‘PSCs’)124 have played an increasing role in conflict situations, 
not only during armed conflict, but also in the withdrawal phase of troops and the 
disposal of military waste and conflict debris. Aneaka Kellay and Onita Das argue 
that the use of PSCs particularly during the peacebuilding stage poses significant 
challenges to transparency, oversight, and accountability. They focus on the exam-
ples of Iraq (2003– 2011) and Afghanistan (2001– 2014) to highlight the inadequate 
regulation of these entities. Of particular note is the issue of toxic pollution, increas-
ingly identified as the toxic remnants of war, sometimes created during operations.125 
Kellay and Das claim that there is a lack of clear regulations relating to obligations 
and misconduct of PSCs, including the responsibility of states and other hiring non- 
state parties. They propose the establishment of a ‘PSC compensation fund’ that is 
used for reparation of damage to the environment and compensation for victims 
harmed by PSC actions.
I.4.4 Remedying and preventing harm
The final part of the book focuses specifically on preventing and remedying environ-
mental damage and harm to victims. It analyses how liability, responsibility, damage, 
and harm can be measured, allocated, and enforced in specific areas, such as de- mining 
and removal of toxic and hazardous remnants of war, and how preventive measures can 
be improved (e.g. in relation to review of new weapons).
123 UN Human Rights Council (HRC), Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, 
Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development: Protect, Respect and 
Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 8/ 5, 7 April 2008 (prepared by 
John Ruggie). For more on the Ruggie Framework, see Larissa van den Herik and Jernej Letnar Černič, 
‘Regulating Corporations under International Law From Human Rights to International Criminal Law and 
Back Again’ (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 725.
124 See generally Francesco Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti (eds.), War by Contract:  Human Rights, 
Humanitarian Law, and Private Contractors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
125 See also  chapter 18 in this volume.
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Cymie Payne examines lessons from the practice of the environmental programme 
of the UNCC.126 The UNCC provided a unique liability regime for compensation of 
environmental damage. The Government of the Republic of Iraq faced claims regarding 
the breach of its responsibility to other states. Individuals could make claims for their 
direct losses, but only through a government or an international organization. Payne 
claims that the UNCC’s reparations programme ‘was an example of jus post bellum in 
the most literal sense’. She argues that the UNCC showed moderation in its determi-
nation of claims and valuation of remediation techniques. Iraq was, in sum, required 
to pay less than the total cost of environmental damage that it caused. Environmental 
integrity was prioritized. The Commission acknowledged the precautionary need to 
identify potential risks in order to plan future action. Its work triggered a willingness 
of affected states in the region to cooperate for the improvement of environmental con-
ditions. It might thus have implicitly applied jus post bellum principles (moderation, 
conciliation, participation), without saying so expressly.127 Payne goes further to sug-
gest that generally, environmental reparations provide unique opportunities for coop-
eration at the end of conflict. Jus post bellum can bring legal disciplines together under 
a common rubric, and allows a more constructive approach to their application to pre-
serving environmental integrity in the transition to peace. Ultimately, she asserts that 
waiting until conflict ends to provide for environmental protection is short- sighted.
Merryl Lawry- White provides a broader perspective on reparative practices, draw-
ing on multiple fields (e.g. environmental law, human rights, humanitarian law, tran-
sitional justice). She claims that is unfeasible to establish a ‘general model’ to deal with 
environmental harm in post- conflict settings (e.g. civil, administrative, or criminal). 
Rather, the strategy must be tailored to the context.128 Lawry- White shows that there is 
limited empirical evidence indicating how reparative mechanisms respond to the needs 
and desires of environmental victims. She argues that reparations should not only serve 
the retrospective purpose of (to the degree possible) redressing the damage done, but 
also the prospective goal of reinforcing the rule of law and creating the foundations 
for a sustainable and just peace.129 She cautions that normal judicial mechanisms may 
be both overwhelmed and poorly constructed for providing reparation for the type of 
massive, widespread environmental harm that frequently results from armed conflict.
Ursign Hofmann and Pascal Rapillard address a deadly and enduring threat to and 
within the environment after certain armed conflicts: mines. Mine action, particularly 
126 See generally Christopher S. Gibson, Trevor M. Rajah, and Timothy J. Feighery (eds.), War 
Reparations and the UN Compensation Commission (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Cymie Payne 
and Peter Sand (eds.), Gulf War Reparations and the UN Compensation Commission (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 2011).
127 On jus post bellum considerations in the work of the Eritrea- Ethiopia Claims Commission, see 
Markus. Krajewski, ‘Schadensersatz wegen Verletzungen des Gewaltverbots als ius post bellum am Beispiel 
der Eritrea- Ethiopia Claims Commission’ (2012) 72 ZaöRV 147.
128 See in this sense Report of the Secretary General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict 
and Post- conflict Societies, UN Doc. S/ 2004/ 616, 23 August 2004, Summary (‘We must learn as well to 
eschew one- size- fits- all formulas and the importation of foreign models, and, instead, base our support on 
national assessments, national participation and national needs and aspirations’).
129 On environmental reparation, see Michael Bowman and Alan Boyle, Environmental Damage in 
International and Comparative Law:  Problems of Definition and Valuation (Oxford:  Oxford University 
Press, 2002).
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clearance, fosters peacebuilding not only through the restoration of a safe environment 
but through employing former combatants as deminers and allowing the repatriation 
of refugees and internally displaced persons.130 But clearance of remnants of conflict 
can affect ecosystems and have a negative impact on vegetation or the composition 
and fertility of soil. The Anti- Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions131 are silent in relation to the environmental impact of contamina-
tion and do not expressly regulate liability for such types of damage. Hoffmann and 
Rapillard argue that mine action organizations, like all humanitarian actors, need to 
consider the possible negative impacts of their operations to ensure they ‘do no harm’ 
and do not lead to further degradation of the environment, longer- term vulnerability, 
and threats to livelihoods. They discuss ways to address liability for environmental deg-
radation from remnants of conflict and in particular for their removal. They provide 
particular attention to the responsibility of armed non- state actors. They argue that 
obligations of such non- state actors should be approached through the lens of duties 
of care.
Anne Dienelt focuses on preventative measures under international humanitar-
ian law and their role in protecting the natural environment. Procedures, such as 
the marking of protected sites and zones132 as well as the duty to review new weap-
ons, means, or method of warfare under Article 36(1) of Additional Protocol I133 
can contribute to protect the environment in relation to armed conflict. Dienelt 
shows that review procedures under Article 36 were mainly meant to guide peace-
time conduct, rather than post- conflict peacebuilding. But she argues that post- 
conflict assessments are useful and states are required to learn lessons from past 
conflicts when it comes to environmental protection, since ‘after the war’ is often 
‘before the war’.
The last contribution by Doug Weir deals with the removal of toxic and hazardous 
remnants of war.134 Weir traces major steps taken over past decades to address rem-
nants of war. He shows that treatment of conflict pollution involves environmental and 
humanitarian considerations. Weir discusses in particular, the new draft principles of 
the ILC regarding remnants of war, which relate clearance duties specifically to envi-
ronmental damage. He criticizes that draft principle 16 merely obliges states to ‘seek to 
remove’ remnants.135 But he concludes that the principles seem to be moving in a posi-
tive direction.
130 Kristian Berg Harpviken and Rebecca Roberts, ‘Conclusions’ in Kristian Berg Harpviken, and 
Rebecca Roberts (eds.), Preparing the Ground for Peace. Mine Action in Support of Peacebuilding (Oslo: PRIO, 
2004), 55.
131 See generally Karen Hulme, ‘The 2008 Cluster Munitions Convention: Stepping Outside the CCW 
Framework (Again)’(2009) 58 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 23.
132 See Arts. 59 and 60 of Additional Protocol I, and Art. 15 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
133 See Justin McClelland, ‘The Review of Weapons in Accordance with Article 36 of Additional Protocol 
I’ (2003) 85 International Review of the Red Cross 397.
134 On the Toxic Remnants of War Project, see <http:// www.toxicremnantsofwar.info/ > accessed 15 
August 2015.
135 See also Hulme (n 25) 38.
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I.5 Not a Conclusion
The chapters in the book clearly indicate the path towards greater protection of the 
environment before, during, and after conflict is still at its beginning. It remains a chal-
lenge to align protection with the political interest of states, and the increasing involve-
ment of non- state actors in armed conflict.
There is growing consensus that it is prohibited to use the environment as a weapon 
in warfare. This is reflected in international humanitarian law, and to some extent inter-
national criminal law. Works such as the ILC principles make it clear that the environ-
ment is not only protected indirectly, namely as civilian object or resource, but directly 
as a system. It is increasingly recognized that environmental protection must be ana-
lysed through the interplay of different law or legal regimes, such as human rights law, 
humanitarian law, environmental law, or disarmament. Institutions such as UNEP, 
the ICRC, or the ILC, and NGOs have a pioneering role in this regard. The Office of 
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court has encouraged the prosecution 
of ‘crimes that are committed by means of, or that result in, inter alia, the destruction 
of the environment, the illegal exploitation of natural resources or the illegal dispos-
session of land’.136 This has a strong expressive and signalling effect as to the gravity of 
environmental crimes.
The realities of contemporary warfare show that pre- conflict, conflict, post- conflict, 
and peacetime cannot be neatly separated, or put into clearly defined ‘boxes’. They 
must rather be seen as a continuum. Duties of prevention, precaution, due diligence, 
or repair of harm run through all of these phases, although they might differ in scope 
and content. Concepts, such as the progressive realization of rights, play a useful role in 
steering transitions as a process.
Specific rules and principles governing transitions from conflict to peace are still 
in development. These are often more fluid than conventional ‘hard law’, derived 
from other bodies of law, or framed as principles, guidelines, or practices. Some of 
them, such as the principle of moderation, have been applied implicitly by post- 
war institutions. Others become clear or explicit through general practice, such as 
peace treaties, UN resolutions, manuals, or the work of expert bodies, such as the 
ILC. In light of the specificities of post- conflict environments, opinio juris might 
have greater value in the formation of customary rules or principles than state 
practice.137
The volume indicates that there are strong links between the peace- orientation of jus 
post bellum and environmental principles, such as intergenerational equity and precau-
tion. Many of the draft principles of the ILC may not be formally labelled as post bellum 
principles, but reflect arguments that have been made in jus post bellum scholarship. Jus 
136 ICC, OTP Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, 15 September 2016, para 42, at <https:// 
www.icc- cpi.int/ itemsDocuments/ 20160915_ OTP- Policy_ Case- Selection_ Eng.pdf> accessed 15 August 
2017.
137 In relation to international humanitarian law, see the famous statement by the ICTY, Prosecutor 
v. Kupreškić, 14 January 2000, IT- 95- 16- T, para 527 (‘This is however an area where opinio iuris sive neces-
sitatis may play a much greater role than usus, as a result of the aforementioned Martens Clause’).
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post bellum scholars have argued that responsible planning, pragmatic limitation, con-
ciliation, and burden- sharing are fundamental elements of post- conflict peacebuilding. 
These elements are reflected in the ILC draft principles. There is emerging agreement 
that prevention and precaution, due diligence, and a collective approach to remediation 
of harm are buildings blocks of a post- conflict law that takes into account environmen-
tal protection.
Moreover, from a macro perspective, there might be a shifting of the lens regarding 
the treatment of responsibility. Traditional legal theories are agent- based. They look at 
individual contribution of actors to the harm, and their responsibility. In the field of 
environmental harm, this perspective is unsatisfactory. From a perspective of protec-
tion, the focus should not be exclusively on the wrongdoing of the agent, but mostly on 
the environment as object of care.138 It is thus feasible to apply a care- driven approach 
towards responsibility, which is grounded in cooperation, solidarity, and capacity to 
remedy harm (remedial responsibility). Suggestions to improve the status quo include 
better monitoring of environmental harm, enhancing assistance models in environ-
mental and disarmament agreements, closing gaps in relation to non- international 
armed conflict and non- state actors, strengthening of trust funds, and preventive 
mechanisms.
Of course, many challenges remain. The list is long. But the volume marks a start-
ing point for states, international organizations, and civil society to discuss, debate, and 
engage on conflict and the environment. Such dialogue is urgently needed. It will need 
to be continued in future decades.
138 For an assessment of duties of care under international humanitarian law, see Karen Hulme, ‘Taking 
Care to Protect the Environment: A Meaningless Obligation?’ (2010) 92 International Review of the Red 
Cross 675. On jus post bellum, see Sigal Ben- Porath, ‘Care Ethics and Dependence— Rethinking Jus Post 
Bellum’ (2008) 23 Hypatia 61; Carsten Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum and the Ethics of Care’, at <http://opiniojuris.
org/2014/05/09/jus-post-bellum-symposium-jus-post-bellum-ethics-care/> accessed 15 August 2017 .
